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Abstract 
 
 
 Different perspectives on the role of organized interests in democratic politics imply 
somewhat different temporal sequences in the relationship between legislative activity and the 
influence activities of organized interests.  Unfortunately, a lack of data has greatly limited 
any kind of detailed examination of this sequence.  We address this problem by taking 
advantage of the temporally very precise data on lobbying activity provided by the door pass 
system of the European Parliament (Berkhout and Lowery 2011).  After reviewing the several 
different perspectives on the timing of lobbying and legislative activity, we present the data 
used in our analysis and then use them to consider the larger issue of what our findings can 
tell us about the role of organized interests in democratic politics and, more importantly, our 
theories of organized interests in the policy process.
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Stopping by the European Parliament for a Chat: 
Organized Interests and the Timing of Legislative Activity 
 
 
 What is the relationship between the timing of legislative actions and the activity of 
organized interests?  This is an important question because, despite a half century of work on 
the politics of interest representation, the literature offers an extraordinarily wide range of 
assessments of the role of organized interests in democratic politics.  These views range from 
the traditional pluralist view (Truman 1951) that such interests are a vital part of democratic 
governance to assessments that they exert a pernicious influence by essentially purchasing 
public policy and, thereby, extract rents (Olson 1982).  And a few theorists even assert that 
organized interests are instead exploited by political officials via their manipulation of public 
policy agendas in what amounts to extortion racket designed to secure campaign support 
(McChesney 1997).  In a somewhat more benign organizational-based version of this 
argument, neocorporatist scholars tend to emphasize the relative strength of political officials 
in setting the agenda and the activity of interest organizations responding to political events 
(or, at best, occurring contemporaneously with legislative or executive activity) (Streeck and 
Kenworthy, 2005, 452; Wessels, 2004, 202).  Sorting through these very several perspectives 
has constituted a very large part of our collective research agenda on organized interests.  
More to the immediate point, these different perspectives imply somewhat different sequences 
in the relationship between legislative activity of governments and the influence activities of 
organized interests.  That is, they respectively suggest that the latter might lag, lead or be 
contemporaneous with the former.  Thus, a close examination of their temporal relationship 
might provide an important lens through which to assess these wide-ranging perspectives on 
the role of organized interests in democratic governance. 
 Unfortunately, the lack of data needed to examine this temporal relationship has 
greatly limited any kind of detailed examination of this important question.  Beyond case 
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studies of specific, usually very controversial pieces of legislation with their inherent and 
inevitable selection biases, systematic data has been limited to examination of legislative 
activity in the national and state governments of the United States and their relationship to 
lobbying activity as provided via lobby registration data (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and 
Semanko. 2005; Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson 2005).  Lobby registration data, 
however, are typically reported on an annual basis, making them extremely lumpy in terms of 
assessing the precise timing of legislative activity and the lobbying of organized interests.  As 
Gray et al (2005) note, the annual data at best suggest that their relationship appears to be 
contemporaneous.  But this may only be because, at the level of annual observations, more 
precise assessments of their timing simply cannot be observed.   
 We address this problem, and thereby the larger question of the role of organized 
interests in democratic politics, by taking advantage of the temporally precise data on the 
entry of organized interests into the EU interest community provided by the door pass system 
of the European Parliament (Berkhout and Lowery 2011).  These data, while not without their 
own unique problems, have the very significant advantage that they can be sliced into very 
precise temporal units (of about four to eight weeks).  They thus provide an almost unique 
opportunity to systematically assesses the relationship between the timing of legislative 
activity and lobbying.  In the first section of the paper, we review the several different 
perspectives on the timing of lobbying and legislative activity along with a number of 
practical limitations on their interpretation.  We then present the data used in our analysis.  
Following the analysis of that data, we return to consider the larger issue of what our findings 
can tell us about the role of organized interests in democratic politics and, more importantly, 
our theories of organized interests in the policy process.  
Lagging, Leading, or a Contemporaneous Relationship 
 In reviewing the many different perspectives now offered on the relationship between 
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the timing of legislative and lobbying activity, we start with the first of two null hypotheses.   
This first perspective suggests that the two activities are substantively contemporaneous 
where, by substantive, we mean that there is no causal relationship between them.  Rather, 
they are both responsive to something else.  In this pluralist view, both lobbying activity and 
legislative agendas reflect less each other than real policy issues facing society.  Thus, 
Truman (1951, 511) identified the locus of mobilization in disturbances in society.  Organized 
interests engage in political activity to secure redress on these disturbances.  But executive 
and legislative entrepreneurs also have powerful incentives to monitor their constituents’ 
concerns (Wawro 2000).  Parties too win elections by finding issues on which to campaign 
(Macdonald and Rabinowitz 2001).  This does not mean, of course, that organized interests 
play an insignificant role.  Indeed, pluralists assert that they are vital in sharpening political 
officials’ understanding of the public’s concerns (Truman 1951; Denzau and Munger 1986).  
But if both government officials and organized interests are responding swiftly to the same 
disturbances in society, then we should see the volume of lobbying activity and the content of 
legislative agendas changing in a contemporaneous manner with both reflecting the public’s 
concerns.  But we must also note that while this traditional pluralist expectation might be well 
founded for national governments, it is less clear that it applies so forcefully to the institutions 
of the European Union given its attenuated linkage between the citizens and political officials. 
 A second hypothesis suggests that the content of legislative agendas lags lobbying 
activity.  There are a variety of different perspectives on the politics of interest representation 
that might be consistent with such a sequence.  Traditional critics of interest group pluralism 
(Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman 1984) imply that presence in the lobbying community 
insures success in both defining legislative agendas and the actions taken upon their items.  
Critics of the campaign finance system in the U.S. often assert that interest organizations buy 
legislation (Drew 1999; West 2000).  Similarly, Stigler (1971) and Peltzman’s (1976) 
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economic model of organized interests, like that of Olson (1982), implies that organizations 
approach legislators with demands for protection from market competition and that they are 
nearly always successful.  All of these models suggest that agendas change following the 
mobilization of organizations for political activity.  Unfortunately, all are somewhat weak in 
empirically relating activity and agendas.  Schattschneider and Schlozman do not analyze 
policy agendas; focusing only on lobbying presence, they simply assume that presence 
implies influence.  Stigler and Peltzman’s work are formal models with no empirical content, 
and much the same can be said about Oslon (1982).  And despite findings that U.S. campaign 
contributions and lobbying are closely related (Ansolobehere, Snyder, Tripathi. 2000), the 
precise causal link between campaign contributions and policy agendas remains highly 
contested (Wright 1996).  Even more problematic in terms of our data, it is not at all clear that 
organized interests have the means to purchase policy in the European Union.  The critical 
currency in these analyses of the American cases is comprised of campaign contributions, 
something that organized interests obviously have little access to in Brussels.   
But even models that are less critical of organized interests and less dependent on 
campaign finance as an instrument of influence often opt for a sequence suggesting that 
organizations precede agendas.  Especially important here is Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) 
punctuated equilibrium model of the policy process.  In their view, legislative agendas are 
quite sticky, changing only periodically as the prior policy regime becomes incapable of 
addressing new issues.  But interest organizations play a significant role in bringing about 
these changes, raising new issues and new perspectives on old issues.  As Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993, 190) note, “The mobilization of interests changes over time, and with these 
changes come differences in the likelihood of certain issues to hit the public agenda.”  
Nownes’ (2003) time series analysis of the mobilization of gay and lesbian organizations 
reaches a similar conclusion.  While some initial possibility of success is necessary for the 
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first organizations in a policy area to mobilize, growth of imitators and competitors follows 
swiftly, which only then leads to more frequent success in first securing space on policy 
agendas and then winning policy victories.  Similarly, Brasher, Lowery, and Gray’s (1999) 
time series analysis of the boom and bust cycle of mobilization in the Florida interest system 
found that a huge build-up of its interest community occurred over the decade of the 1980s 
prior to resolution of a long-standing fiscal crisis.  These studies have offered important 
insights about long-term changes in interest systems.  Still, they examine what are almost by 
definition exceptional cases – the emergence of new issues and/or significant changes in the 
composition of interest communities.  It is less clear whether the population dynamics of most 
interest organization guilds and the kinds of lobbying activity that comprise politics as usual 
typically follow this pattern. This is especially so because recent research shows that there are 
marked differences between cases where organized interests lobby to change policy and 
where they seek to maintain the status quo policy (Baumgartner et al. 2009).  
Our third hypothesis suggests that legislative agendas lead change in the composition 
of interest communities.  While not a common view within political science or in European 
analyses of organized interests, this hypothesis lies at the heart of one of the major 
competitors to the Stigler-Peltzman-Olson model within economics (Mitchell and Munger 
1991).  The lagging model switches the direction of corruption, with politicians extorting 
campaign funds from economic sectors by introducing bills that compel them to organize for 
political activity so as to pay protection money (Mueller and Murrell 1990; Coughlin, 
Mueller, and Murrell 1990; Shugart and Tollison 1986).  That is, politicians introduce bills to 
expropriate rents or to encourage bureaucratic agencies to propose new regulations that have 
the same effect.  The resulting rush to the capitol constitutes an auction that “provides 
valuable information whether regulator action or inaction will be more lucrative to politicians 
themselves; it helps to identify the likely payers and to set the amounts of compensation to be 
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paid” (McChesney 1997, 36).  Over time, politicians learn who the most lucrative extortion 
targets are and maintain a steady stream of proposed legislation to insure that funds continue 
to flow.  In this model, agendas arise neither from the demands of interest organizations nor 
disturbances in society.  Rather, they arise from the need of legislators to raise campaign cash 
or some equivalent resource that they value.  Thus, legislative agendas are constructed prior to 
lobbying activity, with the latter responding to the former.   
Though from a fundamentally different point of view, neocorporatist and institution-
oriented scholars would expect a similar time-order.  In such a view, interest organizations 
enter into a relatively long-lasting exchange relationship with policy makers.  Indeed, over 
time, organized interests may develop very close ties with state actors.  In the words of 
Streeck and Kenworthy (2005, 452), the former “may turn into extended arms of 
government.”  Such ties are especially likely to develop when governments provide subsidies 
or give interest organizations a formal role in policy implementation.  Although such ties may 
become so close as to render the occurrence of legislation and lobbying so proximate as to be 
contemporaneous, we think in more likely in such cases that organized interests typically 
react to, and thus lag, legislative activity.  In the EU case, it has been argued that political 
actors create – through, among other incentives, subsidies – the very interest community that 
is affected by the legislation (Greenwood, 2007; Sanchez-Salgado, 2007).  Before legislation 
on subsidies is adopted, there is simply no organized interest present to lobby. 
Although there have been a few indirect tests cited in support of its core propositions 
(Beck, Hoskin, and Connelly 1992; McChesney 1997, 83-85), the underlying assumptions of 
the lag model have rarely been examined empirically.  In one exception, Lowery, Gray, and 
Fellowes (2005) found that the size and breadth of U.S. state legislative agendas are only 
weakly or even inversely related to a number of variables that would seem to address directly 
the incentives of legislators to raise campaign cash – the costs of state legislative electoral 
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campaigns, the extent to which they are publicly financed, and the presence of contribution 
limits.  More broadly, it seems unlikely that the hard extortion version of this view can 
provide a general explanation of the structure of interest communities.  Even in the United 
States, most organized interests do not contribute campaign funds, the purported reason for 
their existence from the legislator’s perspective.  And when we turn to European cases, this 
currency of extortion is missing entirely, and there is no obvious alternative currency that 
might provide the kind of powerful incentive to fuel this kind of coercive relationship.  Nor 
do most interest organizations in Europe receive some form of subsidy. 
Still, there are other reasons to expect that the relationship between lobbying and 
legislative activity might be a leading one.  That is, the pluralist model suggests that 
organized interests respond to disturbances (Truman 1951).  But not all disturbances are 
limited to exogenous events occurring in society.  Rather, government activity itself 
constitutes a powerful disturbance to whic organized interests might well respond   And 
indeed, studies of this “demand” function of lobbying in the U.S. and the European Union 
have often found that greater government attention to policy issues powerfully draws 
organized interests into lobbying activity (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and Semanko. 2005; 
Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson 2005; Messer, Berkhout, and Lowery 2011).  
However, such findings are largely based on very lumpy temporal observations and/or cross-
sectional observations across the American states or the European Union.  A more precise 
level of measurement is needed.  But such more precise observations might be especially 
expected to uncover such a lagging demand response in the case of the European Union.  That 
is, given the very powerful policy role of the European Commission, we might well expect 
organized interests to rush to the European Parliament as an appeals court, thereby seeking 
redress to the policy disturbances inherent in Commission policy proposals.   
Finally, we must consider a number of practical limitations that together comprise 
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something of a second null hypothesis – in this case, an observational null hypothesis.  That 
is, the activities around which organized interests mobilize are not all of a single kind.  These 
differences might make it difficult to observe a simple pattern of contemporaneous, lagging, 
of leading relationship.  First, not all issues attract the same level of activity on the part of 
organized interests.  Some issues attract the attention of only one or a few organized interests, 
others pit small groups of interests against each other (e.g., air and rail transport), and still 
others generate titanic battles between armies of lobbyists representing, for example, 
consumer and producer interests (Smith 2000).  A leading function might be far more 
plausible for the first, where a specific interest is seeking a change in policy, and less so for 
the last, where organized interests are drawn to the sound of an on-going battle.  Second, 
different kinds of interests might respond to a given policy proposal at different times.  Thus, 
one set of interests (e.g., rail transport interests) might promote policy changes advantageous 
to them, thereby leading policy activity.  Their success might well generate a lagging response 
by other interests (e.g., air transport interests) if the very success of the first set of interests 
constitutes a disturbance to the second’s vital interests.  While evidence of such counter-
mobilization is limited (Gray, Lowery, Wolak, Godwin, and Kilburn 2005), it remains an 
attractive hypothesis in the literature.  In either case, we might see lagging, leading, and 
perhaps even contemporaneous responses simultaneously. 
A final complication in this regard concerns the kinds of interest organizations that are 
either responding to or generating policy activity.  That is, while all of the models we have 
examined here tend to treat all organized interests as if they were the same, there are marked 
differences in their levels of policy involvement.  While observations of populations of 
interests in the U.S. and the European Union have found them to be highly volatile with 
considerable churning within interest communities, a few interests are nearly permanent 
members and most but temporary residents there for a short time (Anderson, Newmark, Gray, 
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and Lowery 2004; Berkhout and Lowery 2011).  The former, the old bulls among lobbying 
organizations, are often advocacy groups whose main purpose is lobbying to promote or 
impede lobbying change.  The latter – the mayflies of the lobbying community – are often 
interests whose main functions are not advocacy per se (e.g., producing tires).  They appear 
only as policy impinges on their primary interests (Gray and Lowery 1995).  It would seem 
likely that the old bulls might well be more likely to engage in leading policy change while 
the latter are more responsive, and thus lag, proposals for policy change.   
Testing the Competing Expectations 
Data   
 In order to test the arguments outlined above, we combine two unique sources of 
information directly relevant to the puzzle we have identified – data on the interest group 
registration at the EP and data on the legislative activity of the EU from EURLEX.  In the 
following section, we briefly describe these two data sources.  
 The European Parliament maintains a door pass system for lobbyists.  Everyone 
entering the Parliament’s premises as a lobbyist is expected to register on this list (EP, 2003-
ongoing).  This registration list is available online and reports personal names and 
organizational affiliation.  If not renewed, the accreditation expires after one year.  The door 
pass requirement has been part of the Rules and Procedures of the European Parliament since 
1996.  For a more elaborate discussion of the register in relation to other registers and its 
history, see Chabanet (2006: 10, 21), Balme and Chabanet (2009: 208-234), and Berkhout and 
Lowery (2008, 2011).  While limited in many respects, the door pass data have a number of 
advantages for our purpose in comparison to other directories (CONECCES, Public Affairs 
Directory).  First, as said, the register is relatively time sensitive. Second, the door pass 
system poses a low entry barrier as various types of organizations may register.  .  At the same 
time, there still is a certain threshold that must be passed for registration; contrary, for 
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instance, to the EC directory of interest representatives, one cannot register online and a 
registrant needs to provide personal and organizational information.  This is good and 
representative data source for the purpose of our study both because the door passes are 
important, indeed necessary, to lobbyists in conducting their influence activities and because 
the list is well administered by the Parliament. 
 We use more or less bi-monthly copies of the register for the time period 2007-2009. 
These copies have been merged into a single database listing all 6033 unique organizations 
registered at any moment in time between 2007 and 2009.  Organizations have been identified 
on the basis of the exact spelling of their names in the register.  This probably still leaves 
some duplicates.  For instance, ABN AMRO may have been registered between 2007 and 
2008 as ABN AMRO and then reappear under the title of ABN AMRO Liaison Office in 
2008.  Other duplicates may have arisen from different languages used; that is, organizations 
sometimes appear under both their French and English names.  While student coders removed 
one listing of such duplicate organizations when recognized in their own portion of the 
sample, duplications across coders may remain. While such duplication error is largely 
random, it may be that this slightly biases our sample towards, for instance, “tourists” or 
:mayflies” in the lobbying system when spelling differences arise from re-registration of 
national associations when these may often use multiple working languages.  However, we do 
not have any theoretical expectations to think that these types of organizations are more or 
less likely to lag, lead or be contemporaneous to legislation and they should consequently not 
affect our substantive results.  
 A random sample of 1300 organizations was drawn from the list described above.  The 
sampling was done after their merger into a single list.  This means that organizations that are 
present throughout the time period studied have the same chance to be in the sample as those 
that were present for only a very short period of time.  On the aggregate, however, this 
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produces a sample that is not representative of the lobby activity over the full time period 
because organizations that have been present for four years are likely to have developed more 
activities than organizations that were present for only a couple of months.  However, we are 
interested in changes in the interest community in terms of or in association with the policies 
lobbied.  Still, if anything, this bias towards ‘tourists’ in the system (and an overestimation of 
system volatility) should make it more likely to find a relationship between interest 
community changes and legislative activity.  
 Four student coders visited the websites for each organization and recorded the kind of 
interest each group represents (business, public, societal, or cross-sectoral) as well as the 
specific policy areas that each group/organization lists as its policy priorities (see below for a 
description of the categories used).  Intercoder reliability for the placing of groups into policy 
areas was moderate (0.60 for Cohen’s Alpha).  The presence or absence of a group on 
different copies of the registry enabled us to track the coming and going of each group, and 
hence the number of groups present in each policy area for a given period.  Because the 
register was copied frequently, but not always after the same length of time elapsed, we 
aggregated the series upward to quarters.  Hence from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 
2009, we have interest organization counts for twelve periods for each policy area. 
 The data used to track the legislative output of the EU is derived from the EURLEX 
(former CELEX) database /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm/.  First, we extracted the 
information on all legal acts (directives, regulations, and decisions) for the period 2005-2009. 
Relying in the search functions of EURLEX does not produce precise information (for 
example, one gets numerous corrigenda of legal acts listed separately in the list of results).  In 
responding to this potential problem, we used automated data extraction to obtain data at the 
lowest possible level of aggregation (legal act) and performed all further manipulations and 
categorizations using this legal act-level data. 
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 In order to categorize the EU legislative output, we used the classification heading 
provided by EURLEX. The classification headings provide a hierarchically-structured 
scheme.  That is, each legal act was put into several (up the three) categories.  The main list 
consists of 13 categories, and under each of the general categories there are additional 
subheadings.  Annex I shows how we mapped our policy domains to the existing categories of 
the EURLEX classification system. 
Method of analysis  
 We examine the relationships between interest organizations and legislative 
production using a series of vector autoregression (VAR) models (Brandt and Williams 
2007).  In VAR modeling, each potentially endogenous variable is regressed on lagged values 
of other endogenous variables and lagged values of itself (and any exogenous variables) using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.  The significance of individual coefficients (for each 
lag) is less important than the joint significance of the set of lags for each variable (assessed 
using a conventional F-test): if the lags of one variable together improve the fit of the model 
of the dependent variable over the lags of that dependent variable alone, then we say that that 
variable “Granger causes” the dependent variable (Granger 1969).  By estimating a model as 
a set of equations for each potentially endogenous variable, causality between endogenous 
variables can be assessed in both directions.  We estimate a simple VAR model for each 
policy area, with only the number of interest organizations (excluding public organizations) 
and the total legislative output as endogenous variables with no exogenous variables.1  The 
number of lags included was dictated by circumstances: although the performance of VAR 
modeling improves when a sufficient number of lags can be included to account for all 
dynamics, with such a short time series we chose to include only two lags.2 
 
1 The legislative output time series shows no signs of auto-correlation. The time series of the number of interest 
organizations appears to be first-order auto-correlated according to the examination of the auto-correlation and 
the partial auto-correlation functions.  
2 The results changed little when one, two, or three lags were included. 
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Findings 
Table 1 presents the results of the models for the specific policy areas.  Among sixty-
four policy areas, significant results (indicating Granger causality in one direction) are present 
for only nine, but even these should be viewed skeptically as some significant results should 
be expected due to chance alone.  Histograms display the relative frequency of the different p-
values observed for each direction in Figure 1. Changes in legislative output lead to changes 
in the number of interest organization registrations in the general energy and nuclear energy 
policy areas, two areas in which both business and advocacy groups should lag and lead, 
respectively, legislation (thus generating ambiguous expectations).  Evidence for the opposite 
relationship – legislative output lagging the registration of organized interests – exists in three 
agricultural areas (eggs, fruit and vegetables, and sugar), general energy, “other” services, 
textiles, justice and human rights, and general transport.  While the significance of justice and 
human rights in this direction seems to support the notion that, in policy areas dominated by 
advocacy groups, interest organization should lead legislative output, contrary findings exist 
for areas dominated by business interests (transport, services, and textiles). 
 The story becomes even more complicated when the signs of these effects are 
considered.  Thus in the case of the sub-policy-fields “Agriculture: Eggs” and “Agriculture: 
sugar,” the biggest cross-correlation between interest groups and legislation is found for lag 1 
and is negative (the correlation is maximized for interest organizations at time zero and 
legislation from time -1).  Hence, although interest organization registrations seem to lead 
legislation in these cases, their registration is associated with a decrease in legislative output. 
The same negative relationship is observed for fruit and vegetables and justice and home 
affairs.  On the other hand, a positive relationship between from interest organization 
registrations to legislation is found in the general transport category. 
 Table 2 reports the results for the models using the aggregated policy areas, while 
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Figure 2 shows in histograms the p-values obtained.  Using this categorization, only the 
internal market policy area shows significant results, with legislation leading interest groups.  
Business interests dominate this area.  But in this case, the contemporaneous correlation is 
largest (but positive, indicating that increased numbers of interest organization registrations 
are associated with increased legislative output, during the same period).  In general, 
however, we see no relationship over time in lobbying registrations and legislative activity in 
most policy areas. 
 Similar results were obtained with various other model specifications we examined.  
In addition to adjusting the lag length, both legislative output and interest organization 
registration numbers were operationalized differently in several of these alternative 
specifications.  Legislative output was examined using only Directives, only Regulations, and 
only legislation on which the European Parliament played a role.  The total number of interest 
organizations was replaced with the number of business organizations and advocacy 
organizations, respectively.  Some policy areas gained or lost significance, but no major 
changes in the general pattern of mixed – and mostly null – results were observed. 
Conclusion 
 Such largely null results must be considered from a number of perspectives.  First, 
from an empirical standpoint, the analysis can be improved in several ways.  First, a longer 
time series (as it becomes available) might enable us to better account in terms of statistical 
power for the dynamics in the relationships between legislation and interest organization 
mobilization.  And it could be argued that the two-year period observed here might be too 
short to observe the interplay between these two series across a full policy cycle, from the 
earliest informal proposal stage to the final adoption.  Moreover, the availability of more data 
points would enable us to include more lags in the VAR models without compromising their 
reliability.  Second, the categorization of legislation based on EURLEX codes may exclude 
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key legislation directly affecting interests in a given policy area, while including legislation 
that is of peripheral importance to those interest organizations.  Interest organizations lobby 
specific pieces of legislation, not policy areas as a whole.  Thus, we would not argue that our 
analysis necessarily offers the final word on these relationships.   
 Still, we are not persuaded that our null and mixed findings can be fully explained by 
these data imitations.  In regard to the first set of issues, especially, the data were very well 
suited to the theoretical question at hand.  Indeed, the key problem with the few prior studies 
of the temporal relationship between legislative and lobbying activity has been the lack of 
shorter-term observations of their co-variation, not a lack of data on longer-term co-variation.  
And the length of the time series in terms of lags and leads encompasses well the time period 
in which most legislation is considered.  And even greater specificity of linking lobbying and 
legislation would seen unlikely to dramatically alter our findings given the essentially null 
results for both our specific and general policy results.   
 Instead, we think that we need to give greater attention to the observational null 
hypothesis introduced earlier in our discussion of the competing theoretical expectations 
about the temporal relationship between legislation and lobbying.  The several theoretical 
perspectives we noted – highlight lagging, leading, and contemporaneous effects – are 
essentially caricatures that are typically drawn from studies of specific, often extremely 
controversial or prominent (changes in) legislation or specific interest organizations that are, 
again, often atypical in the sense of a prior reputation for influence that may largely be related 
to maintaining status-quo policies and legislation.  More often than not, scholars extract 
lessons from these atypical cases that they then apply to interest organizations as a whole, 
suggesting that all interest organizations operate in an environment in which, alternatively, 
they or government policymakers dominate the process. The truth is likely to be much more 
complex.  Interest organizations sometimes lag, sometimes lead, and sometimes 
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contemporaneously engage the public policy process.  Given this mix of modes of 
engagement, null results would be expected and none of the caricatures would be expected to 
provide a sufficient account of the complexities of the policy process insofar as it involves the 
activities of wide range of quite different kinds of interest organizations, a wide range of 
different kinds of policy proposals, and a wide range of governmental actors. 
 So, while more complete data and more thorough data analysis might well be called 
for, it may be even more important that we step back to address the rather thin – and at the 
same time overly broad – theoretical expectations provided by the caricatures now available 
in the literature on interest representation.  That is, we need to step back and consider in a 
much more precise manner when and how organized interests become engaged in the policy 
process.  This will necessarily entail considering how interest organizations differ among 
themselves, when and how they react to each other, and when and how different kinds of 
policy legislation engage the activities interest organizations.  Given the null results presented 
here, such more complex theoretical expectations are needed to drive further empirical 
analysis beyond merely looking for more detailed and dynamic central tendencies in the 
timing of legislative and lobbying activity.  Does time matter?  Almost certainly.  But it is 
likely to matter in several different ways for different policies and different interest 
organizations.  At a minimum, our null results suggest that a single, simple pattern of 
temporal relationship is unlikely to be sufficient or satisfying.  
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Table 1. Results from Granger causality tests I: Sub‐policy fields. The numbers reported 
are the p‐values from the F‐tests of the OLS estimations. The time period covered is from 
the first quarter of 2007 until the last quarter of 2009 (12 observations). Two lags have 
been included. For the scope of the sub‐policy fields, see Annex I. The signs in the 
brackets indicate the signs of the OLS coefficients for the two lags of Legislation in the 
equation for Interest Groups (second column) and the two lags of Interest Groups in the 
equation for Legislation (third column). 
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Figure 1 Histogram and density of the p-values from the Granger causality tests (63 
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Table 2. Results from Granger causality tests II: General policy fields. The numbers 
reported are the p‐values from the F‐tests of the OLS estimations. The time period 
covered is from the first quarter of 2007 until the last quarter of 2009 (12 observations). 
Two lags have been included. For the scope of the general policy fields, see Annex I. The 
signs in the brackets indicate the signs of the OLS coefficients for the two lags of 
Legislation in the equation for Interest Groups (second column) and the two lags of 
Interest Groups in the equation for Legislation (third column). 
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Annex I. List of policy areas and the corresponding EURLEX classificaton codes 
   
Detailed category General category EURLEX category 
Agriculture: animal 
protection Environment 15.40. Protection of animals 
Agriculture: animals Agriculture 03.50.30. Animal health and zootechnics 
  Agriculture 03.60.52. Pigmeat 
  Agriculture 03.60.57. Beef and veal 
  Agriculture 03.60.68. Sheepmeat and goatmeat 
Agriculture: cereals Agriculture 03.60.51. Cereals 
Agriculture: eggs Agriculture 03.60.53. Eggs and poultry 
Agriculture: feedingstuff Agriculture 03.50.10. Animal feedingstuffs 
  Agriculture 03.60.62. Dried fodder 
Agriculture: fisheries Fisheries 04.05. General, supply and research 
  Fisheries 04.07. Statistics 
  Fisheries 04.10.10. Structural measures 
  Fisheries 04.10.20. Market organisation 
  Fisheries 04.10.30. Conservation of resources 
  Fisheries 04.10.30.10. Catch quotas and management of stocks 
  Fisheries 04.10.30.20. Other conservation measures 
  Fisheries 04.10.40. State aids 
  Fisheries 04.20. External relations 
  Fisheries 04.20.10. Multilateral relations 
  Fisheries 04.20.20. Agreements with non-member countries 
Agriculture: fruit and 
vegetables Agriculture 03.60.54. Fresh fruit and vegetables 
  Agriculture 
03.60.63. Products processed from fruit and 
vegetables 
Agriculture: general NA 02.50. Mutual assistance 
  NA 
02.50.10. In the application of customs or agricultural 
rules 
  NA 
02.50.20. For the recovery of claims in customs or 
agriculture 
  Agriculture 03.05. General 
  Agriculture 03.07. Statistics 
  Agriculture 03.10. Basic provisions 
  Agriculture 03.10.10. National aid 
  Agriculture 03.10.20. Common agricultural policy mechanisms 
  Agriculture 03.10.30. Accessions 
  Agriculture 
03.20. European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 
  Agriculture 03.20.10. General 
  Agriculture 03.20.20. EAGGF (Guidance Section) 
  Agriculture 03.20.30. EAGGF (Guarantee Section) 
  Agriculture 03.30. Agricultural structures 
  Agriculture 03.30.10. Social and structural measures 
  Agriculture 
03.30.20. Processing and marketing of agricultural 
products 
  Agriculture 03.30.30. Accountancy data network 
  Agriculture 03.30.40. Agricultural statistics 
  Agriculture 03.30.50. Agricultural research 
  Agriculture 03.30.60. Forests and forestry 
  Agriculture 03.40. Monetary measures 
  Agriculture 03.40.10. Fixing of compensatory amounts 
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  Agriculture 03.40.20. Other monetary measures 
  Agriculture 03.50. Approximation of laws and health measures 
  Agriculture 03.60. Products subject to market organisation 
  Agriculture 
03.60.05. Arrangements covering more than one 
market organisation 
  Agriculture 03.80. Agreements with non-member countries 
  Agriculture 06.20.10.10. Agriculture 
Agriculture: hops Agriculture 03.60.66. Hops 
Agriculture: milk Agriculture 03.60.56. Milk products 
Agriculture: oils and fats Agriculture 03.60.59. Oils and fats 
Agriculture: other Agriculture 03.60.69. Other agricultural products 
  Agriculture 03.70. Products not subject to market organisation 
  Agriculture 03.70.10. Silkworms 
  Agriculture 03.70.20. Isoglucose 
  Agriculture 03.70.30. Peas and beans 
  Agriculture 03.70.40. Albumens 
  Agriculture 
03.70.50. Non-Annex II products (now Non-Annex I 
products) 
  Agriculture 03.70.60. Cotton 
  Agriculture 03.70.70. Other agricultural products 
Agriculture: plants Agriculture 03.50.20. Plant health 
  Agriculture 03.60.61. Flowers and live plants 
Agriculture: rice Agriculture 03.60.58. Rice 
Agriculture: seeds Agriculture 03.50.40. Seeds and seedlings 
  Agriculture 03.60.67. Seeds 
Agriculture: sugar Agriculture 03.60.60. Sugar 
Agriculture: tobacco Agriculture 03.60.64. Raw tobacco 
  Agriculture 03.60.65. Flax and hemp 
Agriculture: wine Agriculture 03.60.55. Wine 
Competition policy Competition 08.10. Competition principles 
  Competition 08.20. Restrictive practices 
  Competition 08.20.10. Prohibited agreements 
  Competition 
08.20.20. Authorised agreements, exemptions and 
negative clearances 
  Competition 08.20.30. Supervision procedures 
  Competition 08.30. Dominant positions 
  Competition 08.40. Concentrations 
  Competition 
08.50. Application of the rules of competition to 
public undertakings 
  Competition 08.60. State aids and other subsidies 
  Competition 08.70. Intra-Community dumping practices 
  Competition 08.80. Obligations of undertakings 
  Competition 08.90. National trading monopolies 
Consumer protection Environment 15.20. Consumers 
  Environment 15.20.10. General 
  Environment 
15.20.20. Consumer information, education and 
representation 
  Environment 15.20.30. Protection of health and safety 
  Environment 15.20.40. Protection of economic interests 
Economic policy: general NA 
06. Right of establishment and freedom to provide 
services 
  NA 06.07. Statistics 
  NA 06.10. Principles and conditions 
  NA 06.20. Sectoral application 
  NA 06.20.10. Production and processing activities 
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  NA 06.20.30. Business activities 
  NA 06.20.40. Self-employed activities 
  NA 06.20.50. Medical and paramedical activities 
  NA 06.20.60. Other activities 
  NA 06.30. Public contracts 
  NA 06.30.10. General 
  NA 06.30.20. Public works contracts 
  NA 06.30.30. Public supply contracts 
  NA 06.30.40. Public services contracts 
  NA 06.30.50. Other public contracts 
Economic policy: law NA 17. Law relating to undertakings 
  NA 17.01. General 
  NA 17.10. Company law 
  NA 17.20. Intellectual property law 
  NA 17.30. Economic and commercial law 
  NA 17.30.10. Business procedures 
  NA 17.30.20. Other economic and commercial provisions 
Economic policy: 
monetary EMU 
10. Economic and monetary policy and free 
movement of capital 
  EMU 10.07. Statistics 
  EMU 10.10. General 
  EMU 10.20. Monetary policy 
  EMU 10.20.10. Institutional monetary provisions 
  EMU 10.20.20. Direct instruments of monetary policy 
  EMU 10.20.30. Indirect instruments of monetary policy 
  EMU 10.30. Economic policy 
  EMU 10.30.10. Institutional economic provisions 
  EMU 10.30.20. Instruments of economic policy 
  EMU 10.30.30. Economic and monetary union  
  EMU 10.40. Free movement of capital  
Education, science and 
culture: culture 
Education, science and 
culture 16.40. Culture 
Education, science and 
culture: education 
Education, science and 
culture 16.30. Education and training 
Education, science and 
culture: general 
Education, science and 
culture 16.20. Dissemination of information 
  
Education, science and 
culture 16. Science, information, education and culture 
  
Education, science and 
culture 16.01. General 
  
Education, science and 
culture 16.07. Statistics 
Education, science and 
culture: science 
Education, science and 
culture 16.10. Science  
  
Education, science and 
culture 16.10.10. General principles  
  
Education, science and 
culture 16.10.20. Research sectors 
Energy: coal Energy 12.20. Coal  
  Energy 12.20.10. Promotion of the coal industry 
  Energy 
12.20.20. Competition: rates and other conditions of 
sale 
  Energy 12.20.30. Coal products 
  Energy 12.20.40. Other measures relating to coal 
Energy: general Energy 12. Energy 
  Energy 12.07. Statistics 
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  Energy 12.10. General principles and programmes 
  Energy 12.10.10. General 
  Energy 
12.10.20. Rational utilisation and conservation of 
energy 
  Energy 12.30. Electricity 
Energy: nuclear Energy 12.40. Nuclear energy 
  Energy 12.40.10. Fuel supplies 
  Energy 12.40.20. Power stations and joint undertakings 
  Energy 12.40.30. Safeguards 
  Energy 12.40.40. Nuclear research 
  Energy 12.40.50. Other measures relating to nuclear energy 
Energy: oil and gas Energy 12.50. Oil and gas 
  Energy 12.50.10. Supplies and stocks 
  Energy 12.50.20. Intra-Community trade 
  Energy 12.50.30. Other measures relating to oil or gas 
Energy: other Energy 12.60. Other sources of energy 
Environment: general Environment 15. Environment, consumers and health protection  
  Environment 15.07. Statistics 
  Environment 15.10. Environment  
  Environment 15.10.10. General provisions and programmes  
  Environment 15.10.40. International cooperation  
Environment: nature Environment 15.10.30. Space, environment and natural resources 
  Environment 15.10.30.10. Management and efficient use of space, 
  Environment 15.10.30.20. Conservation of wild fauna and flora  
  Environment 
15.10.30.30. Waste management and clean 
technology 
Environmet: pollution Environment 15.10.20. Pollution and nuisances 
  Environment 15.10.20.10. Nuclear safety and radioactive waste 
  Environment 15.10.20.20. Water protection and management 
  Environment 15.10.20.30. Monitoring of atmospheric pollution 
  Environment 15.10.20.40. Prevention of noise pollution 
  Environment 
15.10.20.50. Chemicals, industrial risk and 
biotechnology 
External relations: CFSP CFSP 18. Common Foreign and Security Policy 
External relations: 
development External relations 11.70. Development policy 
  External relations 11.70.10. General 
  External relations 11.70.20. Aid to developing countries  
  External relations 11.70.20.10. Food aid  
  External relations 11.70.20.20. European Development Fund (EDF) 
  External relations 
11.70.20.30. Aid to Latin American and Asian 
countries 
  External relations 11.70.30. Generalised system of preferences  
  External relations 11.70.40. Associations  
  External relations 
11.70.40.10. Overseas countries and territories 
(PTOM) 
  External relations 
11.70.40.20. African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Group of States 
External relations: 
economic External relations 11.30. Multilateral relations 
  External relations 
11.40. Bilateral agreements with non-member 
countries 
  External relations 11.50. Action in favour of countries in transition 
  External relations 11.60. Commercial policy 
External relations: general External relations 11. External relations 
  External relations 11.10. General 
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  External relations 11.20. European political cooperation 
Health Environment 15.30. Health protection 
Industry: aeronautical Internal market 13.20.30. Aeronautical industry 
Industry: agricultural 
vehicles Internal market 13.30.11. Agricultural and forestry tractors 
Industry: banking and 
securities NA 06.20.20.20. Banks 
  NA 
06.20.20.25. Stock exchanges and other securities 
markets 
Industry: vehicles Internal market 13.30.10. Motor vehicles 
Industry: chemical Internal market 13.30.19. Fertilisers 
Industry: cosmetics Internal market 13.30.16. Cosmetics 
Industry: foodstuffs Internal market 13.30.14. Foodstuffs 
  Internal market 13.30.14.10. Colouring matters 
  Internal market 13.30.14.20. Preservatives 
  Internal market 13.30.14.30. Other provisions 
Industry: general Internal market 
13.40. Internal market: policy relating to 
undertakings  
  Internal market 13.50. Miscellaneous 
  Internal market 13. Industrial policy and internal market 
  Internal market 
13.10. Industrial policy: general, programmes, 
statistics and research 
  Internal market 13.10.10. General 
  Internal market 13.10.20. Programmes and statistics 
  Internal market 13.10.30. Research and technological development 
  Internal market 13.10.30.10. General principles 
  Internal market 13.10.30.20. Research sectors 
  Internal market 13.20. Industrial policy: sectoral operations  
  Internal market 13.30. Internal market: approximation of laws  
  Internal market 13.30.05. General, programmes 
  Internal market 
13.40. Internal market: policy relating to 
undertakings 
  NA 
06.20.10.20. Other production and processing 
activities (225) 
  Internal market 13.50. Miscellaneous 
Industry: insurance NA 06.20.20.10. Insurance 
Industry: iron and steel Internal market 13.20.10. Iron and steel industry 
  Internal market 
13.20.10.10. Competition: prices and other conditions 
of sale 
  Internal market 13.20.10.20. Other measures relating to iron and steel 
Industry: medicinal 
products Internal market 13.30.15. Proprietary medicinal products 
Industry: other goods Internal market 13.20.70. Other industrial sectors 
  Internal market 13.30.12. Metrology 
  Internal market 13.30.13. Electrical material  
  Internal market 13.30.18. Dangerous substances 
Industry: other services NA 06.20.20. Service activities 
  NA 06.20.20.60. Personnel services 
  NA 06.20.20.70. Services provided to undertaking 
  NA 06.20.20.80. Other service activities  
Industry: real estate NA 06.20.20.40. Real property 
Industry: shipbuilding Internal market 13.20.20. Shipbuilding 
Industry: telecom Internal market 
13.20.60. Information technology, 
telecommunications\ 
Industry: textiles Internal market 13.20.40. Textiles 
  Internal market 13.20.50. Leather, hides, skins and footwear 
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  Internal market 13.30.17. Textiles 
Industry: tourism NA 06.20.20.50. Leisure services 
Justice and human rights Social policy 05.20.05.10. Anti-discrimination 
  Social policy 05.20.05.20. Gender equality 
  Justice 19. Area of freedom, security and justice 
  Justice 19.01. General  
  Justice 19.10. Free movement of persons  
  Justice 19.10.10. Elimination of internal border controls  
  Justice 19.10.20. Crossing external borders  
  Justice 19.10.30. Asylum policy  
  Justice 19.10.30.10. Right to asylum 
  Justice 19.10.30.20. Right of refugees and displaced persons  
  Justice 
19.10.40. Immigration and the right of nationals of 
third countries 
  Justice 19.20. Judicial cooperation in civil matters  
  Justice 
19.30. Police and judicial cooperation in criminal and 
customs matters 
  Justice 19.30.10. Police cooperation  
  Justice 19.30.20. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters  
  Justice 19.30.30. Customs cooperation 
  Justice 19.40. Programmes  
  Justice 19.50. External relations 
Regional development Regional development 
14. Regional policy and coordination of structural 
instruments  
Social policy Social policy 
05. Freedom of movement for workers and social 
policy  
  Social policy 05.07. Statistics  
  Social policy 05.10. Freedom of movement for workers  
  Social policy 05.20. Social policy 
  Social policy 05.20.05. General social provisions  
  Social policy 05.20.10. European Social Fund (ESF)  
  Social policy 05.20.10.10. Organisation and reform of the ESF 
  Social policy 
05.20.10.20. Administrative and financial procedures 
of the ESF 
  Social policy 05.20.10.30. Operations of the ESF  
  Social policy 05.20.20. Working conditions  
  Social policy 05.20.20.10. Safety at work  
  Social policy 05.20.20.20. Wages, income and working hours  
  Social policy 05.20.20.30. Industrial relations  
  Social policy 05.20.30. Employment and unemployment  
  Social policy 05.20.30.10. Programmes and statistics  
  Social policy 05.20.30.20. Protection of workers  
  Social policy 05.20.30.30. Employment incentives  
  Social policy 05.20.40. Social security 
  Social policy 05.20.40.10. Principles of social security  
  Social policy 05.20.40.20. Application to migrant workers  
  Social policy 05.20.50. Approximation of certain social provisions  
Taxation Taxation 09. Taxation  
  Taxation 09.10. General  
  Taxation 09.20. Direct taxation  
  Taxation 09.20.10. Income tax  
  Taxation 09.20.20. Corporation tax  
  Taxation 09.20.30. Elimination of double taxation  
  Taxation 09.30. Indirect taxation  
  Taxation 09.30.10. Turnover tax/VAT  
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  Taxation 09.30.20. Excise duties  
  Taxation 
09.30.30. Taxes on capital and transactions in 
securities  
  Taxation 09.40. Other taxes 
  Taxation 09.50. Prevention of tax evasion and avoidance  
Trade: external NA 02.20. Basic customs instruments 
  NA 02.20.10. Customs tariffs 
  NA 02.20.10.10. Common Customs Tariff  
  NA 02.20.10.20. ECSC unified tariff 
  NA 
02.20.10.30. European Community's integrated tariff 
(TARIC) 
  NA 02.20.20. Value for customs purposes 
  NA 02.20.30. Origin of goods  
  NA 
02.20.30.10. Common definition used in non-
preferential traffic 
  NA 02.20.30.20. Rules of origin  
  NA 02.20.30.21. EFTA countries  
  NA 02.20.30.22. Mediterranean countries  
  NA 02.20.30.23. ACP states and OCT 
  NA 02.20.30.25. Countries benefiting from the system  
Trade: internal NA 02.40. Specific customs rules 
  NA 02.40.10. Movement of goods 
  NA 02.40.10.10. Free movement of goods 
  NA 02.40.10.11. Community transit 
  NA 
02.40.10.12. Other arrangements concerning 
movement of goods 
  NA 02.40.10.13. Turkey  
  NA 
02.40.10.20. Extra-Community trade: EFTA 
agreements 
  NA 02.40.10.30. Export procedures 
  NA 02.40.10.40. Elimination of barriers to trade 
Transport: air Transport 07.40. Air transport  
  Transport 07.40.10. Competition rules  
  Transport 07.40.20. Market operation  
  Transport 07.40.20.10. Market access  
  Transport 07.40.20.20. Route distribution  
  Transport 07.40.20.30. Prices and terms  
  Transport 07.40.30. Air safety  
  Transport 07.40.40. Structural harmonisation  
  Transport 07.40.50. International relations  
  Transport 07.40.50.10. Consultation procedure  
  Transport 
07.40.50.20. Conventions with non-member 
countries  
Transport: general Transport 06.20.20.30. Transport  
  Transport 07. Transport policy  
  Transport 07.05. General  
  Transport 07.07. Statistics 
  Transport 07.10. Transport infrastructure  
  Transport 07.10.10. Coordination and investment  
  Transport 07.10.20. Financial support  
  Transport 07.10.30. User tariffs  
  Transport 13.60. Trans-European networks  
Transport: land Transport 07.20. Inland transport  
  Transport 07.20.10. Competition rules  
  Transport 07.20.20. State intervention  
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  Transport 07.20.30. Market operation  
  Transport 07.20.30.10. Market monitoring  
  Transport 07.20.30.20. Market access  
  Transport 07.20.30.30. Transport prices and terms  
  Transport 07.20.40. Structural harmonisation  
  Transport 07.20.40.10. Technical and safety conditions  
  Transport 07.20.40.20. Social conditions  
  Transport 07.20.40.30. Taxation  
  Transport 07.20.50. Combined transport  
  Transport 07.20.60. ECSC provisions  
Transport: maritime Transport 07.30. Shipping 
  Transport 07.30.10. Competition rules 
  Transport 07.30.20. Market operation  
  Transport 07.30.20.10. Market monitoring 
  Transport 07.30.20.20. Code of conduct for liner conferences  
  Transport 07.30.20.30. Market access  
  Transport 07.30.30. Safety at sea  
  Transport 07.30.40. Structural harmonisation  
  Transport 07.30.40.10. Technical conditions  
  Transport 07.30.40.20. Social conditions  
  Transport 07.30.40.30. Taxation 
  Transport 07.30.40.40. Flags, vessel registration 
  Transport 07.30.50. International relations  
  Transport 07.30.50.10. Consultation procedure 
  Transport 
07.30.50.20. Conventions with non-member 
countries  
 
